La variedad de metodologías científicas dedicadas a obtener conocimiento, generar creencias y motivarla acción es amplia. La filosofía de la ciencia y de la educación ha valorado críticamente las virtudes de los diversos métodos científicos, en especial de los inductivos y deductivos. Sin embargo, la aparición de nuevos procedimientos vinculados a ciencias no académicas ha promovido el desarrollo de nuevas perspectivas reflexivas que analicen dichas virtudes. Desde los métodos controlados aleatorios hasta los procedimientosepidemiológicos o clínicos, la filosofía ha examinado las (...) virtudes y también los defectos de su puesta en práctica. El presente artículo asume que la modelación basada en evidencias empíricas es una práctica de alto interés en linguistica. Con el fin de sustanciar tal asunción, se comparan dos enfoques filosóficos de la modelación científicadistinguidos por sus respectivas líneas de investigación en torno a la noción de representación: el representacionaly el pragmático. Los enfoques se ilustran posteriormente con un caso de la linguística denominado análisissintáctico del lenguaje, dirigido a examinar muestras particulares recogidas como evidencias en fases iniciales de la modelación experimental. Como conclusión, se enfatiza que ambos enfoques filosóficos aportan elementosanalíticos realmente pertinentes para el tipo de razonamiento científico que pivota en torno a modelos y cuyo alcance en la enseñanza de las ciencias puede resultar de gran interés práctico. (shrink)

El texto presenta una crítica moderada al excesivo valor pedagógico concedido actualmente a las tecnologías digitales para la enseñanza online. A partir de la sospecha vertida por Andrew Feenberg sobre las bondades supuestas del papel de Internet en la enseñanza superior, se presenta un análisis de la aplicación de las nuevas tecnologías a la educación no presencial y a un tipo particular de problema tecno-epistémico que puede derivar en una disminución cualitativa de la enseñanza en las aulas. Frente a ello, (...) se proponen algunas opciones de mejora y se concluye con un enfoque crítico relativizado que, junto con el reconocimiento de la valía de ciertas tecnologías para las enseñanzas no presenciales, asuma el valor inherente de ciertos elementos tradicionales que no deben ser desmerecidos por intereses económicos ni por tendencias pasajeras. (shrink)

Resumen En el texto se expone un proceso de modelación basado en dos consideraciones (Sec. 2): que los modelos son autónomos y que sus metas directas son al menos tres: estar bien construidos, adecuarse al mundo empírico y ser capaces de realizar tareas subrogatorias. Para ello, se esbozan varios ingredientes fundamentales de la tarea modeladora en la lingüística basada en evidencias, así como los de un marco formal elegido para representar aquellos. La tercera sección está dedicada a aplicar el presente (...) análisis al caso de las redes complejas con el fin de que conceptos clave como la validez, la fiabilidad y la replicabilidad de la modelación, así como el concepto de diseño experimental en RC, se puedan observar desde un prisma representacional. La sección cuarta refleja las capacidades aplicativas de (RC), especialmente en el caso del aprendizaje del lenguaje en casos atípicos y a menudo socialmente marginados. A modo de cierre, la conclusión resume la puesta en práctica de la herramienta RC. Abstract A modeling process is initially outlined based on two considerations (Sec. 2), namely that models themselves are autonomous and that their direct goals are at least threefold: to be well constructed, to fit the empirical world, and to be able to perform subrogative tasks. This section outlines the fundamental elements of the modeling task in evidence-based linguistics, as well as those of a formal framework chosen to represent the former. The third section is devoted to applying the present theoretical analysis to the case of complex networks (CN), so that key concepts such as validity, reliability and replicability of modeling, as well as the concept of experimental design in complex networks, can be viewed from a representational perspective. The fourth section reflects the application capabilities of CN, especially in the case of language learning in atypical and often socially marginalized cases. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the implementation of the CN-tool. (shrink)

The popular notion of bullshit and the term that expresses it has received little philosophical attention despite the fact that it pervades much of human discourse. Frankfurt recovered bullshit analysis in the eighties and opened the way to studies on its nature and function. Our interest in bullshit is philosophically analytical, but also practical, as bullshit particularly affects the field of science policy. In order to understand that double character, we first present Grice’s model of meaning of expressions and then (...) summarize the controversy between the tobacco industry and the US Administration, which allows us to state our basic hypothesis: tobacco companies have developed and implemented a discursive tactic of bullshit in order to delay or avoid governmental regulations and decisions. Before eventually applying the Gricean model to various cases of bullshit, we locate our approach against the background of the comparison between sound and junk science. Keywords: Grice, intention, meaning, tobacco industry, bullshit, junk science, uncertainty. (shrink)

En el texto defendemos que la crítica de Byung-Chul Han a la sociedad actual en sus vertientes epistémica y tecnocientífica es una pseudo-crítica. Su crítica de la noción de transparencia se teje con citas y reflexiones de naturaleza poco clara que chocan de frente con nuestra concepción de lo que es la crítica filosófica. Como alternativa, proponemos una crítica argumentada de los mismos fenómenos a los que apunta Han con el fin de desmontar su propuesta al respecto. Sobre el trasfondo (...) de la filosofía racionalista crítica de Popper y de la semiótica crítica de Eco, proponemos escrutar las nociones de conocimiento, enseñanza y tecnologías a partir del análisis de varios conceptos clave: el pseudo-conocimiento, la posverdad y el bullshit. A partir de ello, sostenemos que hay otros fenómenos (mala ciencia y mala filosofía, cámaras de eco, burbujas epistémicas) cuyo examen nos puede ayudar a acometer nuestra tarea crítica razonada de un fenómeno clave en la actualidad que Han ni siquiera ha previsto: las tecno-enseñanza online. (shrink)

Resumen En este artículo propongo un análisis crítico de varias tendencias filosóficas contrarias al uso de la noción de verdad en el ámbito epistemológico, especialmente la de Rorty. En particular, sostengo que la verdad es un concepto clave para el estudio del conocimiento, especialmente el científico, en cuanto toma una forma concisa en los procedimientos experimentales de carácter probatorio-empírico. Gracias a este enfoque, busco socavar varias tesis de los enfoques de la ‘posverdad’ por medio del uso de un conjunto de (...) procedimientos científicos de obtención de evidencias en varios campos vinculados a la disciplina práctica de la medicina.In thispaper, I present a critical analysis of several philosophical tendencies that go against the use of the notion of truth in epistemology, especially Rorty’s one. Particularly, I claim that truth is a key conceptfor the study of knowledge, especially the scientific knowledge, as it takes a concise form through the experimentalprocedures for eliciting evidences. With the help of this analysis, I seek to undermine some ‘post-truth’ theses by means of analyying some scientific procedures to get evidences in severalfields related to the practical discipline of medicine. (shrink)

First, a brief state of the art on the role of values in science is presented. The main points of the critique of the ideal of a free-value science are depicted (Sec. 2), followed by a framework of four phases in the development of scientific activity that allows us to better assess the influence of values in science. The basic thesis of the present text criticizes the conception close to Heather Douglas’ thesis, according to which values, including cognitive values, can (...) only play an indirect role in science (Sec. 3). In order to show that, at certain phases of science, the explanatory power (a cognitive value) can play a direct role, we propose an examination of structural explanation, as distinguished from mechanistic explanation, in a case of experimental linguistics related to language acquisition (Sec. 4). The conclusion is presented in the last section. (shrink)

La crítica contundente de Quine a las nociones intensionales, así como a todo lo superfluo para una ontología de raíz lógica de primer orden, le condujo a rechazar la validez de la noción de semejanza en el ámbito de las ciencias maduras . El artículo consiste preci-samente en responder a esta crítica desde una perspectiva no formalista en la que la ciencia no se reduce a simple teoría, sino que se comprende como un complejo interactivo de diversas prácticas . Mi (...) respuesta a Quine toma como eje fundamental el análisis de la semejanza en una ciencia madura como lo es la química, y presenta un estudio de caso en el ámbito de la química sintética. El objetivo del artí-culo es en tal sentido triple: por un lado, critico la concepción reductivis-ta quineana de la ciencia; por otro, reclamo la importancia de la semejan-za en química; y, por último, reivindico lo que denomino pragmatismo ex-perimental, un modo de análisis de la tecnociencia que tiene en cuenta la práctica real de ésta y la interacción teoría-experimento-prácticas científicas des-de una perspectiva naturalista. El título incluye el verbo “desquinear”, in-existente en español, en clara referencia a mi negativa de aceptar el análi-sis de Quine.Quine's strong criticism of intensional notions as well as of everything that is superfluous for an ontology based on first order logic led him to deny the legitimacy of the notion of similarity in the realm of the mature sciences . In this paper I try to refute Quine's view by adopting a non-formalistic perspective, i.e., a perspec-tive in which science is not simply reduced to a theory, but is rather seen as an interative complex of several different forms of scientific practices . My reply to Quine has as main pillar the analysis of the notion of similarity in a mature science like chemistry, and is based on a study of a concrete case in the realm of synthetic chemistry. The aim of this paper is, therefore, threefold: first, I shall criticize Quine's reductivism regarding science; second, I shall defend the centrality of the notion of similarity in chemistry; fi-nally, I shall defend what I call experimental pragmatism, i.e., a specific way of analysing technological sciences that takes into account both the actual scientific practice and the interaction between theory, ex-periment and practices from a naturalistic point of view. The title con-tains the verb "de-quining", which does not actually exist in Spanish, but clearly refers to my rejection of Quine's analysis. (shrink)

One of the reasons for Carnap’s (1922) analysis of space was the confounding status of many arguments around the state of the art on that topic at that time. The unsatisfactory views supplied by mathematicians, physicists and philosophers led Carnap to propose a new conception of space. His proposal, which employs the notion of intuition as a fundamental tool, fared better, but clashed with his conventionalists intentions derived from an allegedly tolerant attitude. The notion of intuition here examined allows us (...) to claim that Carnap’s target was also an objectivist epistemological program dependent on certain realistic reminiscences embodied in the notion of evidence or matter of fact (Tatbestand). (shrink)

This paper argues for the theoretical and practical validity of similarity as a useful epistemological tool in scientific knowledge generation, specifically in chemistry. Classical analyses of similarity in philosophy of science do not account for the concept’s practical significance in scientific activities. We recur to examples from chemistry to counter the claim of authors like Quine or Goodman to the effect that similarity must be excluded from scientific practices . In conclusion we argue that more recent conceptualizations of the notion (...) of similarity, particularly Giere’s one, are appropriate for a philosophical analysis that considers scientific practices on equal terms with scientific theory. (shrink)

The article focuses on some discursive defects that influence on decision-making around issues of science and technology (technoscience). Particularly, the nature and use of the linguistic phenomenon known as bullshit are analysed, and the results of this analysis are placed into the general context of the controversy about climate change. The conclusion emphasizes the relevance of avoiding confusions and humbug in the information available to the public and linked to decisions in the realm of science policy or regulation.

Los editores de este libro han conseguido reunir algunas de las mejores firmas de lo que en la actualidad se denomina 'filosofía de la química'. Esta subdisciplina de la filosofía de la ciencia, hasta hace bien poco marginal, comienza a exigir durante la década pasada el lugar adecuado que considera se merece, pero que la falta de análisis especializados, de talante no puramente histórico, por parte de filósofos había imposibilitado. De hecho, la supremacía de los estudios acerca de la reducción (...) de la química a la física ahondó considerable—mente en la falta de interés filosófico por las cuestiones químicas. Las fugaces apariciones de artículos dedicados al tema no hacían sino confirmar la regla de la apatía por él. Muchas eran—y son—las cuestiones que, sin embargo, rodeaban, se plasmaban y podían recibir la aclaración pertinente en el mundo de la filosofía de la química. Cuestiones que, planteadas en el marco general de la filosofía de la ciencia, no siempre se adecuaban al temario de subdisciplinas como la filosofía de la biología o la filosofía de la física. Pero también cuestiones propias de la química que podían incitar a la creación de nuevas estrategias generales. Este libro recoge una serie de respuestas en tal sentido, al proponer un elenco temático que evidencia la amplitud y el interés de los problemas filosóficos que la química origina. (shrink)

Mechanistic information is used in the field of risk assessment in order to clarify two controversial methodological issues, the selection of inference guides and the definition of standards of evidence. In this paper we present an analysis of the concept of mechanistic information in risk assessment by recurring to previous philosophical analyses of mechanistic explanation. Our conclusion is that the conceptual analysis of mechanistic explanation facilitates a better characterization of the concept of mechanistic information. However, it also shows that the (...) use of this kind of information in risk assessment is heavily influenced by pragmatic factors, which have not been sufficiently taken into account in philosophical analysis. Mechanistic models are like hypothesis that have to be validated empirically. Due to their dependence on the standards of evidence, they are subject to the same pragmatic factors. Therefore, recurring to mechanistic information does not lead to closure of the methodological controversies in risk assessment. (shrink)

SENA, Luzia (Org.). Ensino religioso e formação docente . (Religious teaching and teacher qualification) Amauri Carlos Ferreira SANGENIS, Luiz Fernando Conde. Gênese do pensamento único em educação: franciscanismo e jesuitismo na história da educação brasileira. (Genesis of an only thought in education: franciscanism and Jesuitism in the history of Brazilian education) Antônio Francisco da Silva TREVISAN, A. Santo Tomás de Aquino – O Credo: tradução, prefácio, introdução e notas. (Saint Thomas of Aquinas – The Creed: translation, preface, introduction and notes) (...) Ivonei Antônio de Oliveira BENELLI, Sílvio José. Pescadores de homens. Estudo psicossocial de um seminário católico. (Fishers of men. A psycho-social study of a Catholic seminary) João Batista Libanio ESTRADA, Juan Antonio. A impossível teodicéia: a crise de fé em Deus e o problema do mal. (The impossible theodicy: the crisis of faith in God and the problem of evil) Lindomar Rocha Mota USARSKI, Frank. Constituintes da Ciência da Religião: cinco ensaios em prol de uma disciplina. (Constituents of the science of religion: five essays on behalf of a discipline) Roberlei Panasiewicz CONGAR, Yves. Ele é o Senhor e dá a vida. (He is the Lord and bestows life) Roberlei Panasiewicz. (shrink)

This fourteenth volume of Collected Papers is an eclectic tome of 87 papers in Neutrosophics and other fields, such as mathematics, fuzzy sets, intuitionistic fuzzy sets, picture fuzzy sets, information fusion, robotics, statistics, or extenics, comprising 936 pages, published between 2008-2022 in different scientific journals or currently in press, by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 99 co-authors (alphabetically ordered) from 26 countries: Ahmed B. Al-Nafee, Adesina Abdul Akeem Agboola, Akbar Rezaei, Shariful Alam, Marina Alonso, Fran Andujar, (...) Toshinori Asai, Assia Bakali, Azmat Hussain, Daniela Baran, Bijan Davvaz, Bilal Hadjadji, Carlos Díaz Bohorquez, Robert N. Boyd, M. Caldas, Cenap Özel, Pankaj Chauhan, Victor Christianto, Salvador Coll, Shyamal Dalapati, Irfan Deli, Balasubramanian Elavarasan, Fahad Alsharari, Yonfei Feng, Daniela Gîfu, Rafael Rojas Gualdrón, Haipeng Wang, Hemant Kumar Gianey, Noel Batista Hernández, Abdel-Nasser Hussein, Ibrahim M. Hezam, Ilanthenral Kandasamy, W.B. Vasantha Kandasamy, Muthusamy Karthika, Nour Eldeen M. Khalifa, Madad Khan, Kifayat Ullah, Valeri Kroumov, Tapan Kumar Roy, Deepesh Kunwar, Le Thi Nhung, Pedro López, Mai Mohamed, Manh Van Vu, Miguel A. Quiroz-Martínez, Marcel Migdalovici, Kritika Mishra, Mohamed Abdel-Basset, Mohamed Talea, Mohammad Hamidi, Mohammed Alshumrani, Mohamed Loey, Muhammad Akram, Muhammad Shabir, Mumtaz Ali, Nassim Abbas, Munazza Naz, Ngan Thi Roan, Nguyen Xuan Thao, Rishwanth Mani Parimala, Ion Pătrașcu, Surapati Pramanik, Quek Shio Gai, Qiang Guo, Rajab Ali Borzooei, Nimitha Rajesh, Jesús Estupiñan Ricardo, Juan Miguel Martínez Rubio, Saeed Mirvakili, Arsham Borumand Saeid, Saeid Jafari, Said Broumi, Ahmed A. Salama, Nirmala Sawan, Gheorghe Săvoiu, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Seok-Zun Song, Shahzaib Ashraf, Jayant Singh, Rajesh Singh, Son Hoang Le, Tahir Mahmood, Kenta Takaya, Mirela Teodorescu, Ramalingam Udhayakumar, Maikel Y. Leyva Vázquez, V. Venkateswara Rao, Luige Vlădăreanu, Victor Vlădăreanu, Gabriela Vlădeanu, Michael Voskoglou, Yaser Saber, Yong Deng, You He, Youcef Chibani, Young Bae Jun, Wadei F. Al-Omeri, Hongbo Wang, Zayen Azzouz Omar. (shrink)

Collection of monographs published by Instituto Vasco de Administración Publica from 1991 to 1999.

I argue for a theory that combines elements of reliabilism and evidentialism.

Ernest Sosa has argued that if someone knows that p, then his belief that p is “safe”. and Timothy Williamson has agreed. In this paper I argue that safety, as defined by Sosa, is not a necessary condition on knowledge – that we can have unsafe knowledge. I present Sosa’s definition of safety and a counterexample to it as a necessary condition on knowledge. I also argue that Sosa’s most recent refinements to the notion of safety don’t help him to (...) avoid the counterexample. I consider three replies on behalf of the defender of safety, and find them all wanting. Finally, I offer a tentative diagnosis of my counterexample. (shrink)

The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear or where there (...) is no perceived object at all. The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one’s perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use ‘proposition’ broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states. (shrink)

The enactive approach to cognition and the phenomenological tradition have in common a wide conception of ‘intentionality’. Within these frameworks, intentionality is understood as a general openness to the world. For classical phenomenologists, the most basic subjective structure that allows for such openness is time-consciousness. Some enactivists, while inspired by the phenomenological tradition, have nevertheless argued that affectivity is more basic, being that which gives rise to the temporal flow of consciousness. In this paper, I assess the relationship between temporality (...) and affectivity from both a phenomenological and an enactive perspective. I argue that, as opposed to the classical phenomenological view (which favours temporality), and to the enactive view (which favours affectivity), we must take affectivity and temporality as co-emergent. Jointly, affectivity and temporality constitute the basic structures of intentionality. Additionally, using examples from phenomenological psychopathology, I conclude that all intentionality is defined by an anticipatory and affective structure that gives rise to general feelings related to our bodily possibilities in the world. (shrink)

Reliabilism about epistemic justification - the thesis that what makes a belief epistemically justified is that it was produced by a reliable process of belief-formation - must face two problems. First, what has been called "the new evil demon problem", which arises from the idea that the beliefs of victims of an evil demon are as justified as our own beliefs, although they are not - the objector claims - reliably produced. And second, the problem of diagnosing why skepticism is (...) so appealing despite being false. I present a special version of reliabilism, "indexical reliabilism", based on two-dimensional semantics, and show how it can solve both problems. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

One of the ideas that characterises the enactive approach to cognition is that life and mind are deeply continuous, which means that both phenomena share the same basic set of organisational and phenomenological properties. The appeal to phenomenology to address life and basic cognition is controversial. It has been argued that, because of its reliance on phenomenological categories, enactivism may implicitly subscribe to a form of anthropomorphism incompatible with the modern scientific framework. These worries are a result of a lack (...) of clarity concerning the role that phenomenology can play in relation to biology and our understanding of non-human organisms. In this paper, I examine whether phenomenology can be validly incorporated into the enactive conception of mind and life. I argue that enactivists must rely on phenomenology when addressing life and mind so that they can properly conceptualise minimal living systems as cognitive, as well as argue for an enactive conception of biology in line with their call for a non-objectivist science. To sustain these claims, I suggest that enactivism must be further phenomenologised by not only drawing from Hans Jonas’s phenomenology of the organism (as enactivists often do) but also from Edmund Husserl’s thoughts on the connection between transcendental phenomenology and biology. Additionally, phenomenology must be considered capable of providing explanatory accounts of phenomena. (shrink)

Richard Feldman has proposed and defended different versions of a principle about evidence. In slogan form, the principle holds that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. Recently, Branden Fitelson has argued that Feldman’s preferred rendition of the principle falls pray to a counterexample related to the non-transitivity of the evidence-for relation. Feldman replies arguing that Fitelson’s case does not really represent a counterexample to the principle. In this note, we argue that Feldman’s principle is trivially true.

I argue that normative requirements should be interpreted as the conditional obligations of dyadic deontic logic. Semantically, normative requirements are conditionals understood as restrictors, the prevailing view of conditionals in linguistics. This means that Modus Ponens is invalid, even when the premises are known.

It can often be heard in the hallways, and occasionally read in print, that reliabilism runs into special trouble regarding lottery cases. My main aim in this paper is to argue that this is not so. Nevertheless, lottery cases do force us to pay close attention to the relation between justification and probability.

Time plays a significant role in science and everyday life. Despite being experienced as a continuous flow, computational models of consciousness are typically restricted to a sequential temporal structure. This difference poses a serious challenge for computational phenomenology—a novel field combining phenomenology and computational modelling. By analysing the temporal structure of the active inference framework, we show that an integrated continuity of time can be achieved by merging Husserlian temporality with a sequential order of time. We also show that a (...) Markov blanket of the present moment integrates past and future moments of both subjective temporality and objective time in an asynchronous manner. By applying the integrated continuity, it is clear that active inference makes use of both subjective temporality and objective time in an integrated fashion. We conclude that active inference, on a temporal note, qualifies as a computational model for phenomenological investigations. (shrink)

By “epistemic pragmatism” in general I will understand the claim that whether propositions instantiate certain key epistemic properties (such as being known or being justifiably believed) depends not just on factors traditionally recognized as epistemic, but also on pragmatic factors, such as how costly it would be to the subject if the proposition were false. In what follows I consider two varieties of epistemic pragmatism. According to what I shall call moderate epistemic pragmatism, how much evidence we need in favor (...) of a proposition in order to know that the proposition is true depends on our preferences. According to what I shall call extreme epistemic pragmatism, on the other hand, our preferences influence our epistemic position at a more basic level, because they help determine how much justification we actually have in favor of the proposition in question. Simplifying brutally, moderate epistemic pragmatism has it that the more worried we are about a proposition’s being false, the more justification we need in order to know it, whereas extreme epistemic pragmatism has it that the more worried we are about a proposition’s being false, the less justification we have for it. Recently, Fantl and McGrath have presented an interesting argument for moderate epistemic pragmatism, an argument which relies on the principle that (roughly) knowledge is sufficient for action (KA). In this paper I argue that KA, together with a plausible principle about second-order evidence, entails extreme epistemic pragmatism. (shrink)

Evidentialism and Reliabilism are two of the main contemporary theories of epistemic justification. Some authors have thought that the theories are not incompatible with each other, and that a hybrid theory which incorporates elements of both should be taken into account. More recently, other authors have argued that the resulting theory is well- placed to deal with fine-grained doxastic attitudes (credences). In this paper I review the reasons for adopting this kind of hybrid theory, paying attention to the case of (...) credences and the notion of probability involved in their treatment. I argue that the notion of probability in question can only be an epistemic (or evidential) kind of probability. I conclude that the resulting theory will be incompatible with Reliabilism in one important respect: it cannot deliver on the reductivist promise of Reliabilism. I also argue that attention to the justification of basic beliefs reveals limitations in the Evidentialist framework as well. The theory that results from the right combination of Evidentialism and Reliabilism, therefore, is neither Evidentialist nor Reliabilist. (shrink)

I discuss Turri's puzzle about withholding. I argue that attention to the way in which evidence can justify withholding dissolves the puzzle.

In this study, we examine whether, how, and when corporate social responsibility increases promotive and prohibitive voices in accordance with ethical climate theory and multi-experience model of ethical climate. Data from 382 employees at two time points are examined. Results show that CSR is positively related to promotive and prohibitive voices. Other-focused and self-focused climates mediate the relationship between CSR and the two types of voice. Moreover, humble leadership moderates the positive relationship between CSR and other-focused climate. Such leadership moderates (...) the negative relationship between CSR and self-focused climate. Humble leadership also moderates the indirect effect between CSR and the two kinds of voice through other-focused and self-focused climates. The findings of this study provide important insights into how and when CSR influences employee voice. (shrink)

The variety $\mathbb{DHMSH}$ of dually hemimorphic semi-Heyting algebras was introduced in 2011 by the second author as an expansion of semi-Heyting algebras by a dual hemimorphism. In this paper, we focus on the variety $\mathbb{DHMSH}$ from a logical point of view. The paper presents an extensive investigation of the logic corresponding to the variety of dually hemimorphic semi-Heyting algebras and of its axiomatic extensions, along with an equally extensive universal algebraic study of their corresponding algebraic semantics. Firstly, we present a (...) Hilbert-style axiomatization of a new logic called "Dually hemimorphic semi-Heyting logic" ($\mathcal{DHMSH}$, for short), as an expansion of semi-intuitionistic logic $\mathcal{SI}$ (also called $\mathcal{SH}$) introduced by the first author by adding a weak negation (to be interpreted as a dual hemimorphism). We then prove that it is implicative in the sense of Rasiowa and that it is complete with respect to the variety $\mathbb{DHMSH}$. It is deduced that the logic $\mathcal{DHMSH}$ is algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi, with the variety $\mathbb{DHMSH}$ as its equivalent algebraic semantics and that the lattice of axiomatic extensions of $\mathcal{DHMSH}$ is dually isomorphic to the lattice of subvarieties of $\mathbb{DHMSH}$. A new axiomatization for Moisil's logic is also obtained. Secondly, we characterize the axiomatic extensions of $\mathcal{DHMSH}$ in which the "Deduction Theorem" holds. Thirdly, we present several new logics, extending the logic $\mathcal{DHMSH}$, corresponding to several important subvarieties of the variety $\mathbb{DHMSH}$. These include logics corresponding to the varieties generated by two-element, three-element and some four-element dually quasi-De Morgan semi-Heyting algebras, as well as a new axiomatization for the 3-valued Łukasiewicz logic. Surprisingly, many of these logics turn out to be connexive logics, only a few of which are presented in this paper. Fourthly, we present axiomatizations for two infinite sequences of logics namely, De Morgan Gödel logics and dually pseudocomplemented Gödel logics. Fifthly, axiomatizations are also provided for logics corresponding to many subvarieties of regular dually quasi-De Morgan Stone semi-Heyting algebras, of regular De Morgan semi-Heyting algebras of level 1, and of JI-distributive semi-Heyting algebras of level 1. We conclude the paper with some open problems. Most of the logics considered in this paper are discriminator logics in the sense that they correspond to discriminator varieties. Some of them, just like the classical logic, are even primal in the sense that their corresponding varieties are generated by primal algebras. (shrink)

This research uses a survey to analyze types of benefits sought by partners in cross-sector collaborations in Spain and to test and build upon theories that indicate prior collaboration experience and partner alignment will positively affect value creation through the collaboration. Using exploratory factor analysis to operationalize a broad range of potential benefits into more specific concepts, the results of this study identify distinct factors that characterize the types of benefits sought by non-profit organizations and businesses engaged in cross-sector collaborations. (...) Findings show that prior experience and alignment positively affect each factor for value creation. Prior experience is also found to influence the type of benefits sought from cross-sector collaborations and to positively affect alignment in terms of mission and strategy. Unexpectedly, the study also finds that prior experience moderates the effect of alignment on value creation. (shrink)

Many philosophers think that, necessarily, any material objects have a fusion (let’s call that doctrine “Universalism”). In this paper I point out a couple of strange consequences of Universalism and related doctrines, and suggest that they are strange enough to constitute a powerful argument against those views.

Philosophical Issues, Volume 30, Issue 1, Page 54-70, October 2020.